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Issues in cue phrase implicature
Jon Oberlander and Alistair Knott
Abstract
Knott's empirical study of cue phrases has resulted
in a taxonomic classication of some 150 cue phrases.
The taxonomy can be viewed as a partial ordering
on the set of phrases, and hence we can view cue
phrase selection in terms of scalar implicature, follow-
ing Hirschberg. We draw out some of the immediate
consequences of this view, including the problematic
status of the conventional/conversational distinction,
and the proper treatment of high-level cue phrases.
We conclude by considering how to test empirically
some of the new predictions.
Introduction
The call for papers raised a number of questions,
two of which we are directly addressing in new
work:
Coherence How does conversational implicature
relate to other discourse phenomena, e.g., co-
herence and discourse expectations?
Data Are there classes of discourse phenomena
(e.g., ellipsis) which it would be advantageous
to analyse as types of conversational implicature
although they are not currently recognised as
such in the computational literature?
Regarding the Coherence question, there is
certainly general agreement that discourse con-
text aects conversational implicature (cf. Grice
[1975], Thomason [1977]). But in past work, we
have investigated the complementary mechanisms
whereby implicature can be used to help build up
coherent hierarchical discourse structure (cf. Las-
carides and Oberlander [1992, 1993]). So, our ap-
proach to the Coherence question has involved the
study of the role of implicature in the communi-
cation of relational propositions.
Here, we maintain our course|studying impli-
cature beyond the sentence|but on a slightly
dierent tack. In addressing the Data ques-
tion, we currently believe that discourse cue
phrases|such as so, as soon as , and as a re-
sult|are a class of discourse phenomena which
can be re-characterised in terms of conversational
implicature|in particular, in terms of scalar
quantity implicature (cf. Hirschberg [1991]). In
previous work, we have argued that cue phrases
have an intimate connection to discourse coher-
ence relations (cf. Knott [1996]); thinking of cue
phrases in terms of scalar implicature raises in-
teresting new issues concerning criteria for cue
phrase selection, and introduces new implemen-
tational possibilities.
It is worth observing that there are two impor-
tant strands of existing work that touch on dis-
course cue phrases. First, there is Grice's own
original work on implicature, in which he argues
that connectives such as but and therefore trig-
ger not conversational , but conventional implica-
tures. The contrastive sense of but , for instance,
is not part of its semantics, but is an implica-
ture; nonetheless, it is purely conventional|not
calculable from the conversational maxims, not
defeasible, and not detachable. Secondly, there
is work on the connectives or and and , which has
already attempted to cast them in terms of scalar
quantity implicature (cf. Kempson [1975], Har-
nish [1979]). We hope that our approach, driven
by Knott's taxonomy, provides a broad frame-
work, permitting an analysis which challenges the
conversational/conventional split envisaged in the
rst strand, and allowing work from the second
strand to be placed in a wider context.
The rest of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 argues that's Knott's taxonomic
classication of cue phrases can be used to gen-
erate partially-ordered sets, and that the phe-
nomenon is therefore susceptible to an analysis
in terms of scalar quantity implicature. Section
3 then indicates that the semantic basis for or-
dering the phrases provides a direct link to re-
lational propositions. Section 4 discusses appar-
ent problems for the account, arguing that they
hinge on the purely sentential orientation of tra-
ditional tests for implicature, and that this lim-
itation explains why cue phrases were not hith-
erto seen as cases of conversational|rather than
conventional|implicature. Section 5 sketches
ways in which the approach can address speak-
ers' tendency to use apparently vague or uninfor-
mative general cue phrases. We then conclude
by examining possible tests of Gricean hypothe-
ses about cue phrase selection.
Cue phrases and scalar implicature
In this paper, we are interested in looking for im-
plicatures drawn about the structure of a text, as
opposed to about the meaning of its individual
sentences and clauses. To obtain a window onto
these structural implicatures, we are taking sen-
tence and clause connective phrases as our
object of investigation, and are examining the way
they are interpreted. These phrases, together with
certain other surface devices, form part of a class
termed cue phrases by Knott [1996]; the term is
used in a rather broader sense than normal, and
is intended (roughly speaking) to cover all those
phrases which have a semantic import beyond the
clause in which they appear.
1
It is uncontroversial that some phrases in this
class provide more information than others. Con-
sider for example the phrases after and as soon as .
Both phrases provide information about a tem-
poral succession between two events, but as soon
1
See Knott [1996] for a more precise denition, which
makes clear the commonalities between these apparently
diverse linguistic devices.
as provides some information in addition; namely
that the two events are causally linked. The extra
information signalled by as soon as means that
it can only be used in a subset of the contexts
where after can be used. For instance, while both
phrases can appear in Text 1, only the latter is
appropriate in Text 2:
(1) The tension in the boardroom rose sharply
(
after
as soon as
)
the chairman arrived.
(2) The Normans invaded Britain
(
after
*
as soon as
)
the Vikings did.
In other words, after is a hypernym of as soon
as , and as soon as is a hyponym of after . A
graphical representation of these relationships is
given in Figure 1 (i). This representation is the
foundation of Knott's taxonomy of cue phrases, in
which many such relationships are systematically
documented.
Figure 1 (ii) depicts a case where two phrases as
a result and it follows that share a common hyper-
nym so. This case is interesting as the additional
information provided by one hyponym seems to
conict with that provided by the other. We can
think of both phrases as signalling a cause of some
kind, but while as a result is used to describe a
causal relationship between events in the world, it
follows that is used to signal the causal relation-
ship between the belief in a premise and the belief
in its conclusion. So can be used to signal both
kinds of cause:
(3) The footprints are deep and well-dened.
8
>
<
>
:
It follows that
p
So
*
As a result,
9
>
=
>
;
the thief was a heavy
man.
(4) I had a puncture on the M25 on my way back
from work.
8
>
<
>
:
As a result,
p
So
*
It follows that
9
>
=
>
;
I missed
most of the rst half.
after
as soon as
(i) (ii)
so
as a result it follows that
Figure 1: Two Hyponym/Hypernym Relationships
The distinction between the relations signalled by
as a result and it follows that maps onto one which
has been widely discussed, between informa-
tional and intentional relations (Moore and
Pollack [1992]), or between semantic and prag-
matic relations (Sanders et al. [1992]).
The hypernymic, hyponymic and alternativity
relations among cue phrases can be described tax-
onomically, as in Knott [1996]. We can consider
the taxonomic hierarchy to be a partially-ordered
set of expressions, and hence, choice of cue phrase
can be considered in terms of scalar quantity im-
plicatures, after Hirschberg:
Apparently, any poset can support scalar
implicature, although other tests for con-
versational implicature may rule out some
particular posets in particular exchanges.
[Hirschberg 1991:128]
It seems from our initial investigations that the
assimilation of cue phrases to scalar implicature
does reveal commonalities. First, just as B's af-
rmation of the expression 33rd St. expresses un-
certainty as to whether the bus reaches Macy's,
so too the use of the hypernymic after in place of
as soon as carries the implicature that B cannot
arm the queried causal relationship:
(5) A: Does this bus go past Macy's?
B: It certainly goes to 33rd St.
(6) A: Did the Normans invade Britain as soon as
the Vikings invaded?
B: They certainly invaded Britain after the
Vikings invaded.
In a dierent world (signalled by the additional
cues in B's response), B indicates that not only
does the bus reach Macy's, but it reaches a more
distant place in the spatial order. Similarly, B can
use the hyponymic as soon as to indicate that a
more specialised relation holds:
(7) A: Does this bus go past Macy's?
B: (Yes; in fact) it goes to 33rd St.
(8) A: Did the Normans invade Britain after the
Vikings invaded?
B: (Yes; in fact) they invaded as soon as the
Vikings did.
The provision of alternate values also works in a
parallel way:
(9) A: Does this bus go past Macy's?
B: (No;) it goes to 33rd St.
(10) A: Did the Normans invade before the
Vikings did?
B: (No;) they invaded after the Vikings did.
In each of these cases, B's response provides a new
expression, and the salient scale can be consulted
so as to determine whether the answer is com-
patible with the queried value, or is blocking it by
implicature, as in Example 5. Of course, since im-
plicatures are defeasible, we would expect to nd
cases where a implicature can be blocked by prior
context. In the standard illustration, the cardi-
nal implicature from three to exactly three goes
through in Example 11, but not in Example 12:
(11) A: How many children does Bill have?
B: Bill has three children.
(12) A: Does Bill qualify for the large family
scheme?
B: Sure|he has three children.
Indeed, we nd that the same can apply for cue
phrase implicature. Whereas after can usually
have a causal interpretation read into it, this can
be defeated by context:
(13) A: What happened at yesterday's board
meeting?
B: The tension in the boardroom rose sharply
after the chairman arrived.
(14) A: Did the tension in the boardroom rise be-
fore or after the chairman arrived?
B: The tension rose after the chairman arrived.
So, there are certainly indications that cue phrases
can be considered in the light of scalar impli-
cature. We now consider what they signal, be-
fore considering briey some of the limits and
strengths of the approach.
Cue phrases and relational propositions
So, the partial orders which we may use to cal-
culate scalar implicatures will consist of sets
of expressions, ordered via their correspon-
dence to real-world entities and relationships .
[Hirschberg 1991:126; emphasis ours]
It seems plausible that cue phrases are members of
posets; but where do the posets come from: what
`real-world' relationships generate their orderings?
Now, Knott [1996] suggests that we can use the
taxonomy to arrive at a set of features whose val-
ues will describe the space of possible cue phrases.
It is then argued that, in any given case, we can
think of a bundle of feature-values as correspond-
ing to a discourse coherence relation. In this way,
the cue phrase taxonomy generates a hierarchy of
relational propositions, partially ordered by speci-
city.
For current purposes, this means that each un-
derlying feature provides a means of ordering the
set of cue phrases. The simplest cases involve cue
phrases which dier only in that one species a
value for a feature, whereas the other does not.
For instance, the phrase it follows that species
the values of two features, namely causal and
pragmatic; while its hypernym so only species
the value of one feature, namely causal.
More generally, uses of cue phrases in question-
answering contexts|as in the previous section|
can be seen as conrming, denying or replacing a
candidate relational proposition. A replacement
might dier from the candidate in the values given
for several features, but which features (or scales)
are relevant is easy for an interpreter to determine.
The question sets up certain scales as salient; the
answer provides an expression which varies on
some scale(s); implicatures are computed accord-
ingly. In particular, given two feature-value bun-
dles, the dierences can be calculated, and the im-
plicatures concerning relational propositions will
be returned.
Cue phrase scales are actually rather simple. In
the case of the bus going to Macy's in examples
like 5, a one-dimensional spatial scale is estab-
lished, providing a linear ordering on many loca-
tions. But a cue phrase scale partially orders the
possible values for a given feature, and these are
just +,   and unspecified. Hence, many dier-
ent phrases will be grouped together on a given
value of a given scale. Distinguishing two ran-
domly chosen cue phrases will therefore involve
comparison along several dierent scales, rather
than just nding their respective positions on one
comprehensive scale. In this respect, however, it
does not dier from certain implicatures involving
referring expressions:
(15) A: Was that a gazelle?
B: It was certainly brown.
Whereas mention of a gazelle might make salient
a single scale ordering antelopes, mammals and
animals, gazelles have many other features, and
B can respond to A's utterance by arming (or
denying or declaring ignorance of) a value of any
of those features, thereby implicating an answer to
A's question. If this example is treated as parallel
to Example 5, we can say that B has implicated
a degree of uncertainty regarding the identity of
the queried object.
For the moment, we can summarise the position
by saying that cue phrase implicature is in general
one form of multiscalar implicature.
Tests for conversational implicature:
The case of but
We have suggested that cue phrases can be
thought of as licensing and constraining implica-
tures about relational propositions in a discourse;
we have also demonstrated that some of the rela-
tionships in the taxonomy of cue phrases can be
explained in terms of scalar implicature. It might
then be possible to use the taxonomy as the foun-
dation for a systematic study of cue phrase impli-
cature.
However, the use of questions to set up a con-
text in which to examine implicature phenomena
is only appropriate for a subset of cue phrases.
Consider the following exchanges:
(16) A: ? Did John go out but Bill stay in?
B: * No, he went out therefore Bill stayed in.
(17) A:Did John go out and as a result get drunk?
B: * Well, he went and so got drunk.
As these examples show, it is not always possi-
ble to bring connectives `into focus' in the way
illustrated in Examples 6, 8 and 10. In fact, only
sentence subordinators like before and after can
be focused in this way. This might be taken as
evidence against a systematic implicature-based
account of cue phrases.
This suggestion seems to be in accordance with
Grice's own views. In fact, Grice establishes
a completely separate category of implicature,
termed conventional implicature, for dealing
with cue phrases.
2
Conventional implicatures dif-
fer from conversational implicatures in two main
respects. Firstly they are non-cancellable, un-
like conventional implicatures, which can be can-
celled by contextual information. In Example 18,
the implicature `three houses and no more' is can-
celled in the second sentence, but it not possible
to cancel the contrast introduced by but in Exam-
ple 19.
(18) Bob has three houses. In fact, he has more
than that.
2
Grice gives just three examples of conventional impli-
cature: but , and and therefore (Grice [1975]). Other com-
mentators, in particular Levinson [1983], have added to this
list of cue phrases.
(19) Bill is tall, but Bob is small. In fact, there is
no contrast between these two facts.
Secondly, conventional implicatures are detach-
able, as they depend on the particular linguistic
items used. To take an example from Levinson
[1983:128]:
if you substitute and for but you lose the
conventional implicature but retain the same
truth conditions.
However, the detachability and the non-
cancellability of cue phrases are both debatable.
To begin with Levinson's point: whether you lose
the implicature triggered by but when you substi-
tute and depends entirely on how much informa-
tion is inferable from the context. Consider the
following example:
(20) John and Bill are very dierent. John is rich,
(
but
p
and
)
Bill is poor.
The contrast here is easily inferable from context
and world knowledge, and is preserved when and
is substituted.
Furthermore, phrases like but do trigger a
number of defeasible conversational implicatures.
Consider the portion of taxonomy given in Fig-
ure 2, motivated by the examples below:
(21) Bill tried to open the door;
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
but
p
unfortunately
*
despite this
*
whereas
9
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
it was locked.
(22) Bob felt very sick that day;
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
but
p
despite this
*
unfortunately,
*
whereas
9
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
he gave an excellent
performance.
whereas unfortunatelydespite this
but
Figure 2: Some Hyponyms of But
(23) Bill is rich;
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
but
p
whereas
*
unfortunately,
*
despite this,
9
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
Bob is
poor.
The point is that but is an ambiguous cue phrase,
which means quite dierent things in dierent
contexts. It can be used to indicate an unsuc-
cessful plan (as in Example 21), a violated ex-
pectation (as in Example 22), or a contrast (as
in Example 23). The hyponymic phrases unfor-
tunately , despite this and whereas serve to distin-
guish these possibilities explicitly for the reader. If
but is used, the reader must infer the intended re-
lational proposition from context and background
knowledge. The maxim of quantity requires that
the writer only use but in cases where the correct
inference can be made, so that the reader relies on
the assumption that this maxim is being adhered
to when coming to an interpretation. The infer-
ences made by the reader thus have all the char-
acteristics of conversational implicatures; they are
licensed or blocked by context, rather than by the
literal meaning of the expressions which trigger
them; and they are made on the assumption that
the writer is being co-operative.
So how should we explain the strangeness of ex-
plicit cancellations such as those in Example 19?
It it more plausible to attribute it to the diculty
of talking explicitly about relational propositions,
rather than to diculties in cancelling inferences
triggered by but . It sounds almost as strange to
mention the contrast in a case where no inconsis-
tency results:
(24) John is rich; Bill is poor. ??There is a con-
trast between these propositions.
The stipulation that conversational implicatures
can be cancelled explicitly in follow-up sentences
excludes many discourse-level phenomena as a
foregone conclusion, and obscures the interesting
similarities noted above between inferences made
about sentences and about relational propositions.
General Cue Phrases and
Underspecied Relations
We have so far provided evidence that it is help-
ful to think of the interpretation of cue phrases
in the light of Gricean maxims. However, are the
implicatures triggered by a phrase like but really
scalar in nature? The case for after and as soon
as is quite straightforward: after can be used in
the case where the writer is unsure whether or not
a succession of events is immediate. In the right
context, a reader would be able to implicate this
uncertainty from the use of after (as in Example
6). But can but be used in a case where the writer
is unsure whether two propositions stand in rela-
tionship of contrast or violated expectation? This
seems harder to believe. How can a writer not be
fully aware of the rhetorical structure of a text she
herself has created?
One suggestion as to how we might think of
writers `underspecifying' relations is if a conver-
sational maxim is violated in the presentation of
a rhetorical relation. Grice talks about a maxim
being violated when a speaker fails to adhere to it,
and the failure is not obvious to the hearer. For in-
stance, if Bill actually has four children, then B's
answer in Example 25, although literally true, is
a misrepresentation of the truth.
(25) A: How many children does Bill have?
B: Bill has three children.
The reader is not intended to realise that the stan-
dard implicatures are not to be drawn, and thus
a maxim has been violated.
It does indeed seem that high-level cue phrases
may be used to create deliberate and unnoticed
ambiguity in this way. Consider the high-level
phrase so, in an example based on Moore and Pol-
lack's [1992]:
(26) Bush supports big business, so he'll veto
House Bill 1711.
This example can be read in two ways; as a plain
statement of fact about a cause that obtains in
the world, or as an argument that Bush will veto
House Bill 1711. It is only acceptable as a state-
ment of fact if the writer actually knows that Bush
will veto the bill. If the writer doesn't know this
for sure, then it must be interpreted as an ar-
gument, with Bush supports big business as the
premise, and he will veto House Bill 1711 as the
conclusion. The writer could signal this second
interpretation explicitly, for instance by using the
more specic cue phrase it follows that . But by re-
taining the ambiguity, it is possible for the writer
to camouage an argument as a statement of fact.
This is certainly an interesting application of
the notion of conversational implicatures in the
domain of cue phrases. However, it is not quite
the kind of underspecication we require when we
talk about cue phrases as triggering scalar impli-
catures. For high level cue phrases to t into that
picture|without maxim violation|we must con-
sider the possibility that a writer could prevent
implicatures from going through, by using such a
phrase.
It should be possible to test (in an indirect way)
whether this situation ever arises, and if so, how
prevalent it is.
Testing alternative Gricean accounts of
cue phrases
The fact is that general cue phrases like but and
so do exist, and their existence demands an ex-
planation. One hypothesis, then, is that they are
used when a writer wishes to avoid arming more
specic relational propositions. The main alterna-
tive (the obvious move, given what we said earlier
about but and despite) is that they are preferred
when a writer can rely on context to license the
implicature to the more specic relational propo-
sition which the writer intends to pick out. This
assumes that writers strive to avoid redundancy,
observing the maxim of quantity once more.
These hypotheses|Underspecication versus
Redundancy Avoidance|generate testable pre-
dictions, and we can sketch how to go about de-
ciding between them. We know that the latter
hypothesis has been tested in the domain of refer-
ring expressions (cf. Dale and Reiter [1995] for a
review). Results such as those of Pechmann [1989]
indicate that when called upon to pick out one ob-
ject from a group of candidates, people produce
descriptions which are less economical than might
be expected. For example, if asked to identify a
white bird from a set also including a black cup
and a white cup, they will frequently use the mod-
ier white, even though it is not strictly required.
If we think of the objects to be identied as
the relational propositions in a text, a similar ex-
periment can be envisaged to study choice of cue
phrases. Consider the following texts:
(27) Bush supports big business; it follows that
he'll veto House Bill 1711.
(28) Bush supports big business, so he's bound to
veto House Bill 1711.
(29) Bush supports big business; it follows that
he's bound to veto House Bill 1711.
In each of these texts, the relation to be identi-
ed is an argumentative one. In Example 27 this
is signalled explicitly by the cue phrase it follows
that , while in Example 28, it is signalled by the
epistemic modal bound to. In Example 29, both of
these signalling devices are used; in other words,
more information has been provided than is nec-
essary, in violation of the maxim of quantity. The
question is: do we nd such texts being produced
by writers or speakers? This is a question we in-
tend to address in future work.
If either set of predictions is borne out, we would
have an interesting result, expanding Grice's the-
ory to deal with a previously untreated phe-
nomenon. But if the Redundancy Avoidance hy-
pothesis is falsied, there are some particularly
interesting consequences. We would have to take
seriously the idea that a writer might leave as-
pects of their text structure radically underspec-
ied. One way of explaining this might be to
recruit Reiter and Dale's `non-Gricean' account
of referring expressions, which proposes an algo-
rithm that, amongst other things, prefers to use
basic-level predicates (dog , rather than animal or
poodle), unless there is specic reason not to (cf.
Rosch [1978]). But to pursue such a line in this
new domain, we would need to answer another
new empirical question: is there a basic level for
cue phrases?
Summary
This paper begins with the suggestion that the se-
lection of cue phrases in a text can be explained in
the light of Grice's notion of conversational impli-
cature. The suggestion is a relatively new one: im-
plicatures are typically thought of as being about
the interpretation of individual sentences, but not
about the relational propositions in a text.
Some of the standard tests for conversational
implicature are set up specically with sentence
interpretation in mind, and are dicult to use
to examine implicatures about discourse structure
itself. Once this point is acknowledged, the ac-
cepted idea that cue phrases trigger conventional
rather than conversational implicatures is open to
question.
We nish by proposing a way of testing Gricean
hypotheses about cue phrases, in a paradigm sim-
ilar to that used in the experiments cited by Dale
and Reiter. Consideration of alternative hypothe-
ses that may be supported by the experiment
throw up some interesting new suggestions about
the processing of cue phrases.
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